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Abstract 
Identification and evaluation of urban rail transit operating hazard can prevent accidents, and minimize damages 
caused by the accidents. In the process of urban rail transit operations, various factors may interact with each other 
that they function with. After analyzing the security factors of urban rail transit, the urban rail transit hazards are 
identified. According to the characteristics of urban rail transit systems, three hazard factors such as the potential risk, 
the existence conditions and trigger factors are chosen as the evaluation indicators. The approach of Grey Correlation 
Analysis is introduced and used for analyzing and determining the extent of the influences among the factors in a 
system and the degree of correlation among these factors. The grey incidence method is used for evaluating the 
hazards of urban rail transit dynamic operating systems and conducting quantitative analysis of risks in the operation 
process. By studying the actual operating situation of Tianjin metro, the risk points and the hazards of correlation 
degree are identified in this paper; and the relative high risk hazards are obtained. The calculated results of hazards 
show consistency between the model and the real situation and feasibility of the method. This research provides a 
new way to identify and evaluate the hazard of urban rail transit. 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Beijing Jiaotong 
University (BJU) and Systems Engineering Society of China (SESC).  
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Urban rail transit plays an important role in relieving the urban traffic pressure. Though it brings 
convenience to residents, the security problem has been more and more pressing. Identification and 
evaluation of the hazards of urban rail traffic can guarantee the safe operations in urban rail transit, to 
some extent. It is not only the basic prevention of all kinds of accidents, but also the premise that the loss 
falls to the lowest. 
Based on the field research, the author analyses both the accidents in the operation and the impact 
factors in the safety of urban rail transit. Through comparing the hazard identification and evaluation 
methods both in China and overseas, the urban rail transit hazards are collected and sorted in the paper. 
Finally, according to the characteristics of the urban rail traffic system, the urban rail hazards have been 
evaluated using the grey correlation degree analysis method; and furthermore, the Tianjin metro hazards 
are taken for example to demonstrate the feasibility of the method proposed in this paper. 
2. Analysis on urban rail transit safety factors  
The analysis of the urban rail transit safety is the foundation and basis of the identification and 
evaluation of the urban rail transit hazard. It is also the key part in developing the urban rail hazard 
evaluation model. The basic elements that impact the rail traffic safety are human, machine, environment 
and management. People are divided into persons in and out of the system. Machine risk factors mainly 
refer to an unsafe state of object which is divided into line, rail, equipment, vehicles. The factors in 
management are the weak responsibility of leaders in safety, the imperfect safety management institution, 
the imperfect safety education and training system, the unclear safety standard, the unscheduled 
implementation of the safety countermeasures, the unreasonable labor organization and so on. The 
environmental risk factors include internal environment and external environment; the external 
environment can be divided into the natural environment and social environment. The city rail transit 
operation safety factors are shown in Fig.1.  
Fig.1. Urban rail transit operating safety factors 
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Through the analysis of the impact factors and the consideration of common accidents in the urban rail 
operation, the cause of the accident can be found out; and identification of hazards can be realized by 
combining the accident and safety factors. 
3. Evaluation of urban rail transit hazard based on the grey system theory 
The evaluation system of urban rail transit hazards is a gray system in which some part of information 
section is known, while the other part is unknown. The evaluation of hazards identification involves all 
aspects of urban rail operation and it is difficult to fully analyze and control, due to all kinds of factors 
which play a key role in reliability, security and economy. Gray correlation analysis method is based on 
the similar or different development trend of the degree among factors to measure the degree of 
association between factors. This method dose not required excessive amounts of sample, typical 
distribution or large amount of computation. In this paper, the gray correlation analysis method is used for 
evaluation of the hazards classification. 
3.1. The evaluation indicator 
Three composition elements of hazards have been chosen. Potential risk, existing conditions and 
triggering factors are used as risk assessment indicators, when evaluating the hazards using gray system 
correlation analysis method.  
First the following parameters are given: 
L–The possibility of accident or hazardous events(potential risk); 
E–Frequency of exposure to hazardous environments(existing conditions); 
C–The possible outcomes of accident or hazardous events (triggering factors). 
For the identification of hazards i, take Xi={xi(1), xi(2), xi(3)}= {potential risk L, existing conditions E
and triggering factors C} as identification indicators. The values of indicators are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. The values of LEC 
L value E value C value 
Score The possibility of accident Score Frequency Score Outcomes 
10 Entirely possible 10 Continuous exposure 100 
A great many people dead or 
huge damage to property 
6 Likely 6 
Exposed every working 
hours per day 
40 
Many of people dead or major 
property damaged 
3 Possible, but not often 3 Exposed once a week 15 
One person dead or property 
damage greater 
1
Small possibility, completely 
unexpected 
2 Exposed once a month 7 Serious injury accidents 
0.5 Very unlikely, conceivable 1 Exposed once a year 3 Major disability 
0.1 Impossible 0.5 Rare 1 Striking minor accident 
3.2. Data acquisition and sorting 
The acquisitions of indicators’ value come from the evaluation when assessors evaluate the object. As 
the LEC method has a strong subjective scoring, the choice of assessors has a great impact on the 
effectiveness of evaluation results. Therefore, when calculating the indicator parameters, this paper uses 
the methods by several different assessors including the management of Tianjin Metro, operators, 
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designers and researchers. Each kind of assessors has a different weight, and in order to improve the 
reliability and validity of evaluation, weighted average is used to obtain the specific value of different 
indicators after scoring (Table 2).  
Table 2. Weights table 
Assessors Management Operators Designers Researchers 
Weights 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
3.3. Evaluation steps 
The basic idea of using gray correlation analysis for urban rail transit hazards evaluation is: First 
determine each indicator value of hazards for evaluation. Second form a reference sequence using the 
relative optimization principles and then finds the correlation between the sequences of which composed 
every indicator of hazards for evaluation and the reference sequence. Last compare the value of each 
correlation, and then obtain the evaluation results of the risk degree of each hazard.  
Specific steps are as follows:  
Step 1 Using minimum value method for data pre-processing. 
max
x ( )
x ( )
i
i
k
X
k
                                                                          (1) 
Step 2 Determine the reference sequence X0  and the compare sequence Xi. The reference sequence is 
formed by each optimal value of indicators. 
Step 3 Calculate the absolute value of the difference between the reference sequence in each point and 
each sub-sequence ( )i k' , also mean 
0( ) ( ) ( )i ik x k x k'                                                                     (2) 
Step 4 Calculate the two level biggest differences and two level smallest differences. 
First-level-biggest difference  
(max) max ( )i i
k
k'  '                                                                   (3) 
Second-level-biggest difference 
max max max ( )i
i k
k'  '                                                                  (4) 
First-level-smallest difference  
(min) min ( )i i
k
k'  '                                                                    (5) 
Second-level-smallest difference  
min min min ( )ii k
k'  '                                                                   (6) 
Step 5 Calculate the correlation coefficients of each points between reference sequence and each sub-
sequence. The calculate formula is as follows: 
min max
max
( )
( )i i
k
k
UH
U
 x
x
' ' 
'  '                                                               (7) 
U  is resolution factorˈ [0,1]U  ˈusually take 0.5U  ˈalso in this paper U takes 0.5.  
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Step 6 Calculate the correlation, calculate the average correlation coefficient. 
Compare the correlation between the compared sequence Xi and the reference sequence X0  as follow: 
m
1
1 ( )
k
i im
kJ H
 
 ¦                                                                     (8) 
Step 7 Sort the correlation. 
4. Example application—Take Tianjin Metro for example 
Based on the field research of Tianjin Metro, Reference to relevant national standards and reference to 
the results of hazards theoretical studies in both same industry and other industry, conclusions can be 
drawn, that the main existing risk points in Tianjin Metro are: Driving organization, passenger services, 
fire control, dispatch management, equipment management, operator safety, seasonal safety risks and 
other safety risk factors. In this paper, the evaluation for hazards based on the above risk points is studied. 
The table of indicator values for hazards evaluating is shown. 
4.1. Indicator values of hazards 
Table 3. Indicator values of hazards 
NO. Risk Point Hazards 
Weighted data values 
L E C 
1 Operator safety Illegal use of fire 4.90 3.10 51.70 
2 Passenger services Throw cigarette butts 5.10 5.10 22.30 
3 Passenger services Smoking in no-smoking area 5.15 4.25 16.10 
4 Passenger services Deliberately arson 5.17 1.75 44.50 
5 Passenger services Personal mental disorders cannot self-control 3.92 1.90 11.60 
6 Passenger services Safety signs wear or lack 5.30 4.10 4.40 
7 Passenger services Do not security or not complete 3.75 2.15 10.60 
8 Equipment management Improper use of electrical equipment in station 5.30 4.10 40.30 
9 Fire control Not regular maintenance the fire-fighting equipment 3.50 2.10 15.70 
10 Fire control 
Fire and flammable materials(paper products, etc.) not cleared in 
time 
3.30 2.20 20.00 
11 Equipment management Not regularly use of switches and sockets 2.50 2.00 13.90 
12 Passenger services Safety publicity inadequate or missing 2.50 1.50 8.40 
13 Dispatch management Send the wrong command scheduling 5.30 2.35 22.50 
14 Dispatch management 
Emergency (fire, derailment and other accidents) Emergency 
Command improper 
5.20 1.20 35.00 
15 Dispatch management When train equipment failure, emergency command improper 5.20 1.60 25.00 
16 Equipment management Special operations illegal operations 4.00 1.20 33.70 
17 Other No well-developed security management and practices 1.90 1.00 5.60 
18 Driving organization Excessive stress, mood disorders 2.60 3.50 5.60 
19 Operator safety Operating personnel physical load gauge 3.20 3.70 3.20 
20 Operator safety Operate person abnormal state of health or sick to posts 3.00 4.10 4.00 
21 Other No plan or exercise of the prevention and control development 2.45 0.80 7.60 
22 Other Inadequate or missing safety training 4.55 0.70 6.00 
23 Driving organization Driver inattention 6.70 6.80 25.10 
24 Driving organization Drivers speeding violation 6.10 5.80 62.50 
25 Driving organization Driver aggressive violations 6.10 4.35 37.70 
26 Driving organization Drivers regression illegal 6.10 4.05 36.10 
27 Driving organization Driver fatigue 5.90 6.00 12.60 
28 Driving organization Brake too fast 5.63 1.35 13.90 
29 Passenger services 
Passenger grilled and kick the door, the door does not shut down 
normal 
4.13 1.55 1.60 
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Table 3. Indicator values of hazards (continued) 
NO. Risk Point Hazards 
Weighted data values 
L E C 
30 Passenger services Passengers fall into the clearance or the vehicles’ site 1.33 2.15 3.80 
31 Passenger services Unauthorized access to the prohibit equipment and facilities 1.33 0.65 4.00 
32 Driving organization Inexperienced drivers 2.45 2.25 51.70 
33 Driving organization 
Unrecognized occlusive conditions for sending and receiving 
train
1.67 2.40 54.70 
34 Dispatch management Stop or delivery electricity error 1.03 0.65 8.80 
35 Dispatch management Scheduling order delivery errors 1.50 2.15 40.30 
36 Fire control 
Subway station, train investigation and management of security 
risks are not in place 
2.50 3.10 17.70 
37 Fire control 
Abnormal condition of the subway supervision and 
administration not in place 
3.60 5.60 9.80 
38 Operator safety Illegal use of explosive materials 0.90 2.25 57.50 
39 Passenger services Passenger crowded 9.20 7.40 7.00 
40 Passenger services Passenger congestion, divert large passenger does not timely 8.00 5.80 32.90 
41 Passenger services Running, chasing 5.30 5.80 5.20 
42 Passenger services Officers stir, spread false news, causing panic 1.85 2.25 31.90 
43 Passenger services Assault and fighting 2.60 3.00 5.20 
44 Dispatch management Not correctly handle the emergency ventilation 2.10 3.90 13.10 
45 Fire control Occupancy, blocking indoors evacuation routes 3.90 4.80 32.90 
46 Fire control Fire people on duty drunk, absence or sleep 1.35 1.05 16.70 
47 Fire control Damage to water supply system for fire 2.20 2.70 8.00 
48 Passenger services Vagrants and beggars begging behavior of the entertainer 5.30 6.20 1.00 
49 Operator safety Did not recover after the switch manually to move away 1.35 2.15 58.30 
50 Operator safety Staff swap sleeper illegal 2.80 1.20 58.90 
51 Other Foreign body placed in orbit 0.38 0.50 58.90 
52 Other Human deliberate destruction of infrastructure along the track 2.33 0.95 88.00 
53 Other Human poisoning 0.63 0.95 81.40 
54 Operator safety 
Without protection into the generation, storage place for toxic 
and hazardous substances place 
1.03 0.60 6.20 
55 Construction management Illegal construction 2.53 2.50 18.50 
56 Passenger services 
Passengers step into the station and drive by the train with 
flammable, explosive and other dangerous items 
3.00 5.60 43.10 
57 Passenger services Passengers play with fire at station or in the train 1.30 4.00 38.10 
58 Operator safety Using equipment comes to spark 3.90 4.20 7.00 
59 Operator safety Not removal static electricity before safety operation 2.85 1.53 7.40 
60 Equipment management Electrical equipment room smoke appear 0.65 0.65 9.20 
61 Fire control Fire alarm system failure 2.90 2.30 5.60 
62 Fire control Fire service system failure 1.50 2.30 10.60 
63 Fire control Smoke control system failure 1.50 2.30 4.00 
64 Fire control Fire Alarm Failure 1.50 2.30 11.80 
65 Fire control Flammable, explosive materials sealed adverse 1.60 2.15 14.20 
66 Fire control Flammable, explosive materials inadequate protection 1.50 2.15 14.20 
67 Fire control Flammable, explosive materials is not enough protection 1.50 2.15 21.70 
68 Equipment management Defects in communications equipment 2.10 2.70 37.70 
69 Equipment management Defect signal facilities 4.20 2.70 45.60 
70 Fire control Range fire pipe rupture 1.40 3.80 33.10 
71 Fire control Emergency lighting failure 3.40 3.00 25.00 
72 Fire control 
Various types of fire equipment and facilities signage, nameplates 
off, lost 
4.40 1.70 13.00 
73 Fire control Lack of fire-fighting equipment, damage, loss 4.40 1.80 20.50 
74 Equipment management Overrun service equipment 5.10 2.55 40.70 
75 Equipment management Traveling component failure 5.20 4.00 43.10 
76 Equipment management Brake equipment failure 4.20 4.00 38.10 
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Table 3. Indicator values of hazards (continued) 
4.2. Tianjin Metro hazards evaluation algorithm based on gray correlations 
Based on the above table, the hazards evaluation parameter sequences of Tianjin Metro are: 
^ ` ^ `1 1 1 1(1), (2), (3) 4.90,3.10,51.70X x x x  ^ ` ^ `21 2 2 2(1), (2), (3) 5.10,5.10,22.30X x x x  
Other hazards parameter sequence follows the same mode. 
In three evaluate indicators, the optimal value is the smallest, which means that the reference sequence is 
made of each indicator’s optimal value, so the hazards evaluation reference sequence of Tianjin Metro 
is : ^ ` ^ `0 0 0 0(1), (2), (3) 0.38,0.50,1.00X x x x  .
Based on the step for evaluation in section 2.3, the sort of risk degree for each hazards are obtained, 
which is shown in Table 4. 
4.3. Evaluation conclusion 
Based on the above calculation here comes to the conclusion: 
Among the hazards for evaluation, the most dangerous item is drivers’ driving at high speed which can 
easily lead to collision, derailment and other traffic accidents. Compared with the accidents which has 
already occurred, it can be seen that the evaluation conclusion is basically in consistent with the actual 
situation. 
The number of the hazards which have the correlation below 0.5 are: 88, 89, 25, 23, 82, 83, 40, 113, 24, 
which are: Flammable materials inside the station equipment, Electrical equipment wear and tear, leakage, 
NO. Risk Point Hazards 
Weighted data values 
L E C 
77 Equipment management Traction-free flow 4.20 4.00 17.70 
92 Equipment management Gate failure 4.70 7.20 1.00 
93 Equipment management 
Evacuation signs (light) masking, damage, pointing to the 
incorrect 
4.25 3.15 12.70 
94 Fire control Safe exit locking or plug 5.90 4.80 12.60 
95 Fire control A strong impact 3.25 0.95 28.90 
96 Other Heating pipe explosion 3.25 0.50 38.10 
97 Other Slope soil, materials, buildings, construction, load collapse 1.90 2.15 50.60 
98 Other The collapse of underground space rock 0.75 0.65 68.60 
99 Other Unstable roof 0.65 0.65 63.60 
100 Construction management Construction quality is not high 0.53 0.65 76.00 
101 Passenger services Toxic gas leak 0.38 0.50 58.00 
102 Passenger services Poor ventilation 4.00 6.40 8.40 
103 Equipment management Environmental control (HVAC smoke control system) failure 3.80 4.20 20.90 
104 Other Metro design flaws 2.93 0.50 76.00 
105 Equipment management 
The equipment for generation, storage, accumulation of toxic and 
hazardous substances are damage 
1.03 2.15 58.00 
106 Equipment management The failure of power generation’s drive equipment 2.00 3.55 34.70 
107 Other Lifted heavy objects fall off 2.50 2.15 12.60 
108 Equipment management Power supply unit is damaged or leakage 3.80 4.20 33.10 
109 Passenger services 
Unprotected close to the electrified body, high step voltage 
region 
1.50 4.20 11.00 
110 Passenger services Touch the stove and other heat source equipment 0.53 0.75 9.20 
111 Passenger services Touching hot objects 0.53 0.75 9.80 
112 Operator safety Inadequate supplies of emergency rescue facilities 4.70 0.85 25.10 
113 Seasonal safety risks Bad weather 7.40 6.30 40.30 
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Driver aggressive violations, Driver inattention, ATO automatic control system failure, ATS automatic 
protection system failure, Passenger congestion, divert large passenger does not timely, Bad weather, 
Drivers speeding violation. The results show that the drivers play a vital role in city rail safety, and also 
should be bring attention on training and education of drivers and passengers. 
Table 4. The sort table for risk degree of hazards 
NO. 
Degree
value
NO. 
Degree
value
NO. 
Degree
value
NO. 
Degree
value
NO. 
Degree
value
110 0.9154 66 0.7529 9 0.6788 68 0.6308 27 0.5469 
60 0.9152 65 0.7483 44 0.6754 14 0.6287 2 0.5350 
54 0.9139 61 0.7394 35 0.6723 33 0.6282 45 0.5334 
111 0.9120 47 0.7334 42 0.6723 57 0.6275 84 0.5333 
31 0.9078 53 0.7298 81 0.6703 48 0.6238 76 0.5314 
34 0.8945 43 0.7260 38 0.6696 92 0.6220 39 0.5218 
17 0.8446 67 0.7230 104 0.6693 106 0.6154 56 0.5201 
21 0.8266 11 0.7209 80 0.6658 71 0.6131 91 0.5170 
30 0.8186 107 0.7202 105 0.6656 37 0.6116 1 0.5159 
101 0.8110 86 0.7196 36 0.6631 32 0.6085 8 0.5032 
51 0.8097 96 0.7176 10 0.6626 13 0.6046 75 0.5016 
46 0.8095 18 0.7086 16 0.6557 41 0.6002 26 0.5013 
63 0.8027 95 0.7043 73 0.6530 102 0.5981 88 0.4956 
22 0.7889 109 0.7042 49 0.6483 77 0.5924 89 0.4940 
12 0.7740 19 0.7009 58 0.6466 103 0.5847 25 0.4908 
99 0.7715 5 0.6965 52 0.6412 4 0.5775 23 0.4764 
29 0.7705 7 0.6943 50 0.6404 90 0.5764 82 0.4691 
59 0.7667 20 0.6913 78 0.6398 3 0.5747 83 0.4691 
100 0.7653 112 0.6897 70 0.6393 94 0.5670 40 0.4530 
62 0.7640 72 0.6892 6 0.6373 79 0.5615 113 0.4351 
98 0.7590 28 0.6823 93 0.6361 69 0.5539 24 0.4218 
64 0.7579 87 0.6796 97 0.6353 74 0.5515   
85 0.7548 55 0.6796 15 0.6329 108 0.5478   
5. Conclusions 
The conclusion is that the calculated results are basically in line with the actual situation, which 
verifies that the theory using the grey theory for hazard evaluation is feasible to some extent. Through 
combining the cause of the accident and security elements, this paper identifies the hazards, and also 
figures out three indicators value for the evaluation of hazards. Using grey correlation analysis method for 
risk evaluation of Tianjin Metro hazards, the correlation of each hazard can be calculated and the high or 
low risk degree among each hazard can be further obtained. More importantly, some pre-selected ranges 
of representative hazards have been researched, and the hazards which cannot be quantified still need in-
depth studies. 
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